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Abstract
This paper analyzes a unique dataset of art auctions on eBay. We study the behavior of
buyers and sellers, demand and supply, by means of a novel structural estimation approach.
Our empirical framework considers the process of arrival of new bidders as well as the distri-
bution of bidder valuations of artworks being auctioned. We use this empirical framework to
quantify the effect of market congestion, and congestion pricing strategies implemented by
the market intermediary. Because we explicitly model the process of arrival of new bidders,
we can estimate the effect of congestion pricing on the number of bidders, the distribution
of bidders’ valuations, and the final selling price. Using the structural model we can also
measure the impact of congestion pricing on the revenues of the artists and the market inter-
mediary, as well as its effect on consumer surplus. Our results indicate that the congestion
pricing policy acts as a coordination mechanism that facilitates the match between buyers
and sellers.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C51, C72, D44, L11, L14.
KEYWORDS: English Auctions, Internet markets, Structural estimation.
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1 Introduction
The Internet is an important source of current and future economic growth. A significant
proportion of this growth will be generated from trade in online markets: business to busi-
ness, business to customers or among individuals. Online markets are significantly different
from traditional markets and we have only begun to explore their potential. For this reason,
it is important to understand how Internet markets work, what type of market environment
promotes Internet transactions and makes them more rewarding for buyers and sellers, as
well as what type of market imperfections can prevent Internet markets from realizing their
full potential. One problem that can hinder the development of a successful marketplace is
that of market congestion. Congestion in an Internet market occurs when the cost of trade
increases with the presence of additional agents, new sellers most likely.
Internet markets are usually under the command of a market intermediary. The market
intermediary acts as a necessary catalyst for the transaction to occur, and for this reason
it can charge fees for its services. It is likely that the intermediary will want to use market
imperfections, like congestion, to its advantage in order to extract additional profit. Thus,
when studying congestion in this environment one needs to take into account the actions
of the intermediary. In this paper we analyze empirically the issue of congestion in an
specific Internet market and the use of congestion-pricing strategies on the part of the market
intermediary and its effect on buyers, sellers, trade, profit and welfare.
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Congestion pricing has been most often studied within the framework of transport networks. In the
case of transport networks congestion pricing is usually employed with the goal of maximizing social welfare.
In the case of Internet markets the goal instead is profit maximization on the part of the intermediary.
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The existence of congestion in internet markets is not an unlikely event. Consider for
example eBay, currently the most successful marketplace on the Internet, even for the case
of homogeneous goods there are features like the seller’s reputation, or the shipping costs,
that can affect a buyer’s decisions and that are not observed unless he/she incurs the cost
of examining the auction listing. Thus, a seller with a bad reputation imposes a negative
externality on buyers that are not willing to buy from this type of seller. It also imposes
a negative externality on other sellers who are competing to get the attention of potential
buyers. This effect is multiplied when the goods are intrinsically heterogeneous and difficult
to categorize, like in the case of original works of art. A buyer looking for that special
painting may have to browse through hundreds or even thousands of listed items. Even the
most powerful search engine is not very helpful in such case. Anecdotal evidence obtained
from my conversations with artists selling their work on eBay indicates that the increasing
presence of imitations of original art, that is paintings that are created using industrial
methods but that resemble original works of art, are making it very difficult for artist to
compete on eBay. The artists seem mostly concerned by the fact that the dramatic increase
in the number of listings of fake originals within the category of original art makes true
originals very difficult, or costly, to find by potential buyers.
In this paper we study a specific example of congestion pricing in an Internet market.
For several years now eBay has been using a rudimentary form of congestion pricing, or as
they call it “Featured Plus!.” This type of congestion pricing works by giving sellers the
option to incur an extra fee at the time of posting their items for sale and in return having
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these items listed first when buyers search for specific features, or categories. The basic idea
is that potential buyers incur a lower cost of search when looking at “featured items.” In
addition, the data suggests that “Featured Plus!” is also used by sellers as a “signal” of
quality.
3
We analyze data from art auctions by “self representing” artists. This group is composed
of artists who sell their own artwork through eBay. We use this data along with a novel
structural empirical framework to quantify the economic impact of the simple congestion-
pricing scheme implemented by eBay. We explicitly model the process of arrival of new
bidders, and as a result we can estimate the effect of congestion pricing on both the number
of bidders, the distribution of bidders’ valuations and the selling price. Finally, using the
structural model we are able to measure of the effect of congestion pricing in this particular
market.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section two we describe the data to be used in the
analysis. Section 3 sets the stage for our empirical analysis by presenting a sketch of a
theoretical model and the description of the econometric methodology. Section 4 reports
estimation and policy simmulation results and section 5 draws conclusions.
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However, the ”signaling” effect is not the only reason why sellers use feature price since it is also often
used with homogeneous goods (like computer processors).
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2 The Market and the Data
In July 2001 we began collecting auction data from a group of “self representing” artists
on eBay, self-denominated EBSQ (an abbreviation for “e-basquiat” after the artist Jean-
Michel Basquiat). This group is composed of artists who sell their own artwork through
eBay. Although this group did not necessarily include all self-representing artists, to our
knowledge this was the only group of its kind at the time. In most cases the item for sale
was an original work of art, most often a painting but other types of artwork like collages,
ceramic tiles, or sculptures were also collected. In our analysis we use data on original
paintings only.
Over the period of data collection some of the artists originally on EBSQ created other
groups (EBSQ+, ESR@, OW@), that were also included in our dataset. The data collected
includes all the auctions associated with any one of these groups from the third week of July,
2001, to the second week of November 2001. This includes approximately eight thousand
auctions of artworks by self-representing artists on eBay. The selling price of the artwork
auctioned ranges from less than one dollar to hundreds, or even thousands of dollars in a
small number of auctions. Between August and December, 2004, a second round of data
collection was conducted on a subgroup from the original group of artists consisting of those
artists who posted auctions regularly during the original data collection period. This includes
about three thousand auctions.
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The sample considered in this study includes auctions from
4
Whenever feasible, we collected data using computer programs. In cases where this was not possible, a
specific database was used to aid in the collection of data and to minimize errors.
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this subgroup of artists for the years 2001 and 2004.
Sellers offer objects for auction by posting a description of the item being auctioned,
including pictures. Sellers can choose the auction length (three, five, seven or ten days) and
other auction characteristics. Buyers can browse through thousands of auctions posted every
day. Auctions are organized by categories, and subcategories, which simplifies the buyer’s
search. Buyers can also use a powerful search engine and are also able to request information
from the seller about an auction anonymously via email.
Bidders participating in an auction can submit a “proxy” bid at any time before the end
of the auction. As long as a bidder’s proxy bid is higher than the second highest active
proxy bid she will remain the highest bidder, at a price equal to the second highest bid plus
a small increment. Proxy bids can be revised (increased) at any time prior to the end of the
auction. Bidders can also use Snipping programs which allow them to place a predetermined
bid amount at a chosen time before the end of the auction. Only bids above the existing
second highest bid, plus an increment, are acceptable. The highest bidder at the end of the
auction wins the item at a price equal to the second highest bid, plus a small increment.
For each auction, we collected four different types of information: item characteristics,
auction characteristics, bidding history, and artist reputation. Characteristics specific to
the object being auctioned include information on the height, width, style (abstract, pop,
whimsical, etc.), medium (acrylic, oil, etc.) and ground (stretch canvas, paper, wood, etc.).
Auction characteristics include the length of the auction, the opening bid, the shipping and
handling fees, the eBay category in which the object is being listed, and whether the auction
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had a reserve price. The bidding history includes all bids except for the highest bid which is
not reported. At the end of each transaction the buyer and the seller have a chance to rate
their level of satisfaction with the transaction (positive, neutral, negative). Thus, we collect
information on the type of feedback received by the seller in previous transactions.
Several characteristics of this data make it unique. First, the data collected comprises all
eBay market activity for a specific group of sellers for a long period of time, while the data
collected by other researchers usually represents only a narrow snapshot of market activity.
Second, by nature the intrinsic value of artwork is uncertain, especially in the case of less
well-known artists. In contrast, much of the data collected by other researchers refers to
items for which their market value can be determined with accuracy, like coins, stamps or
computers, which lessens the value of auctions as a selling, price-finding, mechanism. Third,
the data can also be used to analyze other issues of interest to economists, like artist’s labor
supply.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the overall sample and the selected subsam-
ple. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics according to the auctions’ featured/not-featured
status. Featured items sell with 90% probability while non-featured items sell with 61%
probability in 2001 and with 48% probability in 2004. The average selling price is about
$200.00 for featured items while it is about $50.00 for non-featured items, in real 2004 dol-
lars. In average, “Featured Plus!” items attract about five bidders while non-featured items
attract less than two. The data suggests that “Featured Plus!” is also used by sellers as a
signal of quality. In particular, featured paintings are about twice the size of non-featured
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items when measured in square feet when compared with non-featured paintings. Table 4
provides frequency tables for specific characteristics of paintings (style, medium and ground).
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the average probability of successful sale across artists.
For the most part this distribution follows closely the 45% degree line. Thus, about 50%
of artist have successful auctions less than 50% of the time, and about 20% of artists have
successful auctions at least 80% of the time.
3 Theoretical Model and Empirical Methodology.
The empirical methodology described in this section combines a model of choice on the part
of the artist as to whether to feature or not to feature a painting with a model of demand
in an auction market environment. First, we present a simple example of an auction that
illustrates all the technical problems that we need to address. After that, we present a
theoretical model of an auction market and the econometric methodology which originates
from the theory.
A. A Simple Example of eBay Auctions.
In order to aid our discussion consider an stylized example of eBay auctions presented
in table 1. Differences across auctions are the result of differences in the timing (order) of
arrival of bids, which results in different sequences of auction prices, denoted s
t
, even thou
the players are the same in all auctions. There are five potential bidders with valuations, v
i
,
equal to $10, $25, $50, $75 and $100, and the starting price is set by the seller at $10. For
simplicity we assume that each bidder bids only one time and her bid equals her valuation. In
7
particular, in auction one all potential bidders have a chance to bid. In contrast, in auction
four only the bidders with the two highest valuations are able to bid, while the remaining
potential bidders are unable to bid because the auction price is higher than their valuation
at their time of arrival. Thus, when studying auctions on eBay we need to be aware of the
following facts: the number of potential bidders may be different from the number of actual
bidders; the time of arrival of bids and their magnitudes matters; and some potential bids
will not be realized. Finally, although in the presented examples the number of potential
bidders is predetermined in actuality this number is stochastic, a function of the auction
characteristics and unobserved in many cases. All these issues will be addressed in our
empirical methodology
B. Description of the Environment.
We model eBay auctions as IPV, ascending-bid, second-price auctions, subject to some
specific rules: The seller of the object being auctioned sets the duration of the auction, T,
and the starting value, s
0
; Bids are submitted at any time within the [0, T ] time interval; At
each point during the auction the value of the current second highest bid, say s
t
, and the
number of current, or active, bidders are public information; New bids arrive sequentially
at any point during the [0, T ] time interval; Any new bid has to surpass s
t
by a minimum
increment in order to be recorded. To keep the notation simple, we will avoid mention of
this minimum increment, except when absolutely necessary.
The distribution of bidders’ valuations: Consider a particular auction ending with
M bids, {b
k
}
M
k=1
, from K different bidders (K ≤M ) with valuations {v
∗
k
}
K
k=1
. Define the
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potential number of bidders as the number of bidders that would have chosen to bid in an
otherwise identical sealed bid auction in which all bids are acceptable, and denote it by N
(≥ K). Each potential bidder, j, assigns a value, v
j
, to the object being auctioned, with
each value, v
j
, being a random realization from a distribution F (v) . Bidders know and care
only about their own valuation. By definition {v
∗
k
}
K
k=1
⊂ {v
n
}
N
n=1
.
The bidders arrival process: We consider only the time of arrival of the first bid by
any new bidder. The process we have in mind is one in which at the time of her first bid
the bidder incurs a certain cost necessary in order to learn about the product by reading the
product description, looking at the available pictures, and perhaps even emailing the seller
with any questions that the buyer may have. After the first bid, we assume that the bidder
can continue bidding as many times as she wants at no additional cost. Also, the timing of
any additional bid from an active bidder conveys no new information to active or potential
bidders, other than its effect on the minimum acceptable bid.
We model the arrival of new bidders to an auction in a way similar to the arrival of
job offers in a structural job search model (Flinn and Heckman, 1982), and also similar to
how previous authors have modeled this arrival process in an auction environment (Wang,
1993). We assume that the arrival of new potential bidders at any time t ∈ [0, T ] follows a
Poisson (λ) process, but only those with high enough valuation of the object being auctioned
end up bidding. Thus, the instantaneous probability of arrival of new bidders is the product
of the arrival rate of potential bidders, λ, and the probability that the existing second highest
bid, say s (t) , is below the new bidder’s valuation v, or equal to
¯
F (s (t)) = 1−F (s (t)). Thus,
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the hazard function for the arrival of new bidders is α (t) = λ
¯
F (s (t)). This also implies that
the hazard function for the arrival of potential, unrealized, bids is λF (s (t)) .
C. Demand Estimation.
The econometric approach to estimation of second-price ascending-bid auctions that we
consider is based on that described in Canals-Cerda and Pearcy (2005). An advantage of
this estimation approach when compared with others in the literature is that it explicitly
models the process of arrival of new bidders, and as a result allow us to estimate the effect
of congestion pricing on the number of bidders, the distribution of bidders’ valuations and
the auction final price.
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The distribution of bidders valuations: Bidders behavior is modeled in terms of the
underlying distribution of bidders valuations and the following two behavioral assumptions:
Assumption 1 : Bidders do not bid more than they are willing to pay.
Assumption 2 : Close to the end of the auction those bidders with valuation of the
item above its current minimum acceptable bid choose to bid their
maximum willignes to pay, if they have not done that already.
The first assumption is identical to that in Haile and Tamer (2003) . The second assump-
tion is somewhat stronger, it guarantees that the winning bid will be equal to the second
highest willingness to pay in auctions with two or more active bidders. The second assump-
5
Other papers that use data from ebay are: Hasker, Gonzalez and Sickles (2001) that assume the number
of bidders to be the same across auctions, and estimate this number, and Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) that
assume this number to be a function of auction characteristics. Neither paper uses data on the time of
arrival of bids to aid their estimation.
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tion in Haile and Tamer states that “Bidders do not allow an opponent to win at a price
they are willing to beat.” This assumption would be equivalent to our second assumption
under the traditional English auction framework employed in most empirical work, as long
as bidders play according to their dominant strategy at some point before the end of the
auction. Our assumptions are consistent with many different types of bidding behaviors. In
fact, in the econometric specification we will only require that the bidder with the second
highest valuation bids her true valuation before the end of the auction and that the bidder
with the highest valuation bids at least as much as the second highest bidder.
Consider a particular auction that ends after time T with M bids being placed, {b
k
}
M
k=1
,
from K different bidders (K ≤M) . Assume also that associated to this auction are N (≥ K)
potential bidders with valuations {v
n
}
N
n=1
. Focusing our attention on the highest bid from
each bidder, say {b
∗
k
}
K
k=1
, and organizing this set in ascending order, we obtain
¯
b
1
<
¯
b
2
< ... <
¯
b
K−1
< max
k
b
∗
k
=
¯
b
K
=
¯
b
K−1
+∆,
with
¯
b
k
representing the k-th order statistic from the set {b
∗
k
}
K
k=1
,
¯
b
K−1
+ ∆ representing
the winning bid, and ∆ representing the minimum increment allowed by eBay. Define also
v¯
n
as the n-th order statistic from the set {v
n
}
N
n=1
. Given assumption 1, Lemma 1 in Haile
and Tamer guarantees that
¯
b
k
≤ v¯
N−(K−k)
, for k = 1, ...,K. In particular, for k = K and
K − 1, we have that
¯
b
K
≤ v¯
N
, and
¯
b
K−1
≤ v¯
N−1
. Furthermore, assumption 2 implies that
¯
b
K−1
= v¯
N−1
. Within this framework, the event
{
(b
k
)
M
k=1
|N
}
has the same probability
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as the event
{
(
(
¯
b
k
≤ v¯
N−(K−k)
)
K
k=1
,
¯
b
K−1
= v¯
N−1
|N
}
, because assumptions 1 and 2 impose
restrictions on the vector of maximum bids only.
Haile and Tamer construct their bounds based on two assumptions. Their first assump-
tion is identical to ours. Their second assumption basically implies that if the winning bid
is
¯
b
K
the bidder with the second highest valuation would not be willing to beat this price, or
v
N−1
<
¯
b
K
. This, along with assumption 1, implies that
¯
b
K−1
< v
N−1
<
¯
b
K
=
¯
b
K−1
+∆, or
∣
∣
¯
b
K−1
− v
N−1
∣
∣
< ∆. Thus, taking into account that ∆ takes a small value, it seems that not
much is lost by implementing instead our assumption 2, which implies that
¯
b
K−1
= v
N−1
.
In addition, our model can be manipulated more easily when conducting structural policy
analysis.
D. Empirical Specification.
Denote by X
i
the vector of artist specific characteristics and by X
j
the vector of char-
acteristics specific to the object being auctioned. The empirical specification models three
different features of the data: The bidders’ arrival process, the bidders’ valuation of the
object being auctioned and the buyer’s feature choice.
The Bidders’ arrival process: The theoretical model describes the arrival of new
potential bidders as a Poisson (λ) process. While this is a convenient theoretical assumption
it is inadequate for empirical work. Two important limitations of the Poisson model are the
excess zeros problem and the overdispersion problem (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). There
are several generalizations of the Poisson model that do not suffer from these shortcomings.
In particular, We model the bidder’s arrival process as a finite-mixture negative binomial
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model. Because this is a well known approach we will not develop the model here. With this
model at hand we can define P (N = n|λ
ij
, T ) as the probability of n potential bidders by
time T, with λ
ij
(t) representing an artist-auction specific hazard. The likelihood of bidders
arrival is not necessarily uniform over the duration of the auction [0, T ] or across items for
sale. For example, impatient bidders may choose to concentrate their attention on auctions
close to their ending time. Also, the available search options on eBay make it easier for a
potential buyer to find out about auctions just after they have been posted or close to their
ending. Thus, we consider a flexible specification of the form λ
ij
(t) = λ (t,X
i
,X
j
) , with
(X
i
,X
j
) defined above, and allow the baseline hazard to take on different values over the
duration of the auction.
The process just described refers to the arrival of potential bidders. However, the arrival
process that we observe in the data includes only actual bidders, that is, the potential bidders
that were able to bid because their valuation of the auctioned item was above the auction
price at the time they were ready to bid. We can model the arrival of new bidders at a
particular time t according to the following parameterization, λ
∗
ij
= λ
ij
¯
F (s
ij
(t)), with λ
ij
defined above and s
ij
(t) representing the minimum acceptable bid at time t.
The Bidders’ Valuation:Denote by v
ijk
bidder’s k valuation of object j being auctioned
by artist i. We impose the following structure on v
ijk
: log v
ijk
= Ψ(X
i
,X
j
) + w
ijk
, where
w
ijk
= log v
ijk
− Ψ(X
i
,X
j
) represents the residual, bidder specific, (log-)valuation of the
object being auctioned. In particular, we consider φ (X
i
,X
j
) = αX
i
+ βX
j
as a convenient
empirical specification. Finally, we assume that the distribution of unobserved valuations
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wijk
is distributed normal.
6
The “Featured Plus!” Choice: As our data shows, featuring an auction increases the
number of potential buyers and thus increases also the probability of sale and the expected
revenues. However, these are not necessarily the only reasons for featuring a painting,
there are also non-pecuniary returns from featuring a painting which may influence an artist
decision to feature. For instance, artists may extract utility from the sale of their art
irrespectively of the selling price. Artists may also extract utility from the fact that their
painting is being viewed, and appreciated, by many potential buyers. Also, a featured
auction may act as advertisement and increase the artist’s customer base. For this reason,
we choose not to model the feature choice as a simple profit maximizing decision. Instead
we model the feature decision on the part of the artist as a discrete choice that is a function
of the artist’s characteristics as well as the characteristics of the painting being auctioned.
Formally, denote by
F
ij
= I
(
F
∗
ij
> 0
)
, with F
∗
ij
= F
∗
(X
i
,X
j
) + ε
ij
.
with {F
ij
= 1} denoting the “Featured Plus!” choice, F
∗
ij
representing the unobservable
utility from featuring the artwork, and ε
ij
representing other idiosyncratic factors affecting
this choice. In this framework, the probability of “Featured Plus!” choice can be defined as
P
(
F
∗
ij
> 0
)
.
7
6
We plan to generalize this framework to account for sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
7
Of course, the implementation of this probability in an econometric model will require some additional
functional form assumptions as well as assumptions about the distribution of ε
ij
.
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The Likelihood: Denote the time of the first bid by bidder k as t
1
k
, for k = 1, ...,K.
The likelihood of a particular observation
(
(b
k
, t
k
)
M
k=0
, F
ij
|b
0
)
can be computed as
P
(
(t
k
)
M
k=1
| (b
k
)
M
k=0
, F
ij
)
P
(
(b
k
)
M
k=1
|b
0
, F
ij
)
P (F
ij
) ,
with P
(
(t
k
)
M
k=1
| (b
k
)
M
k=0
, F
ij
)
equal to P
(
(t
1
k
)
K
k=1
| (s
k
(t
k
))
M
k=0
, F
ij
)
and P
(
(b
k
)
M
k=1
|b
0
, F
ij
)
equal to P
(
(
¯
b
k
)
K
k=1
|b
0
, F
ij
)
, t
1
k
denoting the time of the first bid by bidder k ∈ {1, ...,K} ,
s (t
k
) representing the minimum acceptable bid an instant before a new bid arrives at time
t
k
and b
0
representing the starting value.
The probability P
(
(
¯
b
k
)
K
k=1
)
is a function of the number potential of bidders, which is
unknown. However, assuming that the number of potential bidders is N (≥ K) we can
compute P
(
(
¯
b
k
)
K
k=1
|N
)
. We can also determine the probability of N (≥ K) potential
bidders, P (N |N ≥ K,λ) , conditional on the arrival process P (λ). As a result we can
compute,
P
(
(
¯
b
k
)
K
k=1
)
= E
N
(
P
(
(
¯
b
k
)
K
k=1
|N
))
=
∞
∑
N=K
P
(
(
¯
b
k
)
K
k=1
|N
)
P (N |N ≥ K,λ) .
We can easily compute P (N |N ≥ K,λ). In order to compute P
(
(
¯
b
k
)
K
k=1
|N
)
it is useful to
first represent this probability in terms of the underlying density of bidder’s valuations f (v).
From the relationship between order statistics and the originating random variable we have
that g (v¯
1
, ..., v¯
N
) = N !f (v¯
1
) ...f (v¯
N
) , v¯
1
< v¯
2
< ... < v¯
N
, with {v¯
n
}
N
n=1
representing the set
of order statistics from a random sample of N i.i.d realizations from a random variable with
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associated density f (·) (Hogg and Craig, 1978). The probability P
(
(
¯
b
k
)
K
k=1
|N
)
is equal to
P
(
(
(
¯
b
k
≤ v¯
N−(K−k)
)
K
k=1
,
¯
b
K−1
= v¯
N−1
|N
)
and can be represented as a complex integral of
g (v¯
1
, ..., v¯
N
) . Interestingly this integral has an analytic solution in the form of a recursive
polynomial function of
{
F
(
¯
b
k
)}
K−1
k=1
. The proof of this result relies on simple integration
techniques and is included in appendix 1. With these results at hand, the computation of
P
(
(
¯
b
k
)
K
k=1
|N
)
is a straightforward numerical exercise that can be handled by any modern
desktop computer.
Two special cases are K = 0 and 1. In particular, K = 0 indicates that none of the
potential bidders that had a chance to bid valued the object being auctioned above its
starting bid, P (K = 0|b
0
, N) = P (Max
i=1,...,N
{v
i
} ≤ b
0
) = F
N
(b
0
) . On the other hand,
K = 1 indicates that only a single active bidder was willing to bid above b
0
. In this
case, P (K = 1|N) = P (v¯
N−1
≤ b
0
, b
0
≤ v¯
N
|N) . In the case of a unique potential bidder
we have that P (K = 1|N = 1) = P (b
0
≤ v¯
1
|1) = 1 − F (b
0
) . In general, P (K = 1|N) =
P (v¯
N−1
≤ b
0
+∆, b
0
≤ v¯
N
|N) indicating that the highest valuation should be above b
0
and
all others should be below b
0
+∆. The general case with N > 1 is developed in appendix 1.
4 Empirical Specification and Results.
When considering a reasonable empirical specification one needs to take into account the
specific characteristics of the data at hand. In particular, looking at tables 2 and 3 we
observe first that the average number of bidders is much higher for featured items than for
not-featured items. Also, the average selling price is significantly larger for featured items.
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Finally, the percentage of featured items is much higher for 2004 than for 2001. Based
on these observations we postulate an empirical specification in which both the arrival of
bidders and the bidders’ valuation of objects being auctioned are modeled as two separate
processes, one for featured and one for non-featured items. In addition, the “Featured Plus!”
choice on the part of the artist is modeled separately for 2001 and another for 2004, to reflect
important differences in the artists’ propensity to feature paintings in both years. Thus, the
empirical specification can be represented by six behavioral equations.
A. Interpretation of Results.
We estimate two different versions of the empirical model. In the first version differences
across auctions are captured by a vector of instruments. These instruments include artist’s
specific characteristics, two measures of artists’ reputation, as well as characteristics of the
object being auctioned describing dimensions, styles, medium and ground, dummies for year,
month and the auction ending day. Also included is a dummy to control for the potential
impact of the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001, on this market.
8
EBay allows buyers
to rate their shopping experience by offering a positive (or 1) feedback, neutral feedback (or
0), or negative feedback (-1) to the seller. This rating is used to create a reputation index
representing the percentage of positive feedbacks received from buyers, and we use this index
as a measure of artists’ reputation. Another measure of artists’ reputation considered is the
total number of unique buyers. In addition, the process of a rival of new bidders includes a
baseline hazard that controls for differences in the rate of arrival of new bidders at different
8
The effect of the terrorist attacks of September 11 are addressed more directly in Canals and Pearcy
(2005) .
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times over the duration of the auction. This baseline hazard includes a constant and four
additional baseline parameters. The first baseline parameter accounts for differences in the
arrival of bidders between the second day and the day before the end of the auction, the
second, third and fourth baselines account for differences in the rate of arrival the last day,
the last hour and the last ten minutes of the auction, respectively. Estimation results are
presented in tables 5 and 6.
If there are differences in quality across artists, in addition to those captured by the
vector of instruments, the model parameters could potentially be biased. For this reason,
the second model estimated adds artists’ specific fixed effects to the set of instruments.
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from including fixed effects separately in each
one of the six model equations. As a second best strategy we include fixed effects separately
in the processes of arrival, valuation and the feature choice. In addition, because each one
of these processes is modeled by two equations we assume that the artists’ fixed effects are
proportional in both equations.
9
To preserve the simplicity and parsimony of the models we exclude from the final spec-
ification variables that are highly insignificant (t-values close to zero) in those instances in
which this does not affect the overall interpretation of results. The estimation results for
the first model are presented in table 5, with coefficients significant at the usual significance
level of 0.95 presented in bold. For the process of bid arrivals we observe that new bidders
9
More precisely, if the coefficient associated to a particular artist dummy is δ
a
in equation one, in our
model specification the coefficient associated to the same artist dummy in equation two is of the form β · δ
a
,
with β fixed across artists.
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arrive at a higher rate close to the end of the auction. Some authors have interpreted this as
a sign of complex strategic behavior on the part of the bidders (Roth and Ockenfels, 2002).
Without disregarding that possibility, we would like to point out that more simple expla-
nations also exist. For example, this type of behavior is consistent with a model in which
bidders face a cost of commitment. In particular, if a bidder is interested in more than one
painting in auctions that end at a similar time the bidder may choose to place a bid close to
the end of the auction because bidding implies a commitment to a particular item and this
commitment may be costly. Alternatively, bidding close to the end of the auction may be
just the result of a simple coordination strategy when decisions about how much to bid for
an specific object are made jointly by more than one person. Interestingly, the overall effect
of the eBay feedback score, the percentage of positive feedback from buyers, is insignificant.
This result contrasts with other papers in the literature that find the effect of this variable to
be significant and important in magnitude (Melnik and Alm, 2002). It is possible to reconcile
these apparently contradictory results. Observe that in our dataset all artists have feedback
rates above 98% and a large number of artists have a perfect score. Thus, it is reasonable to
think that buyers may find sellers in the range of 98 to 100 equally trustworthy. In contrast,
the number of feedbacks from unique buyers has a significant positive effect on the arrival
of new buyers. One possibility is that artists that have a large number of customers also
enjoy a larger number of repeated buyers. Interestingly, the size of the painting measured
in square feet has a significant positive effect on the arrival of bidders, the value of the item
and the artist decision to feature. The coefficient assigned to the dummy variable associated
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to year 2001 indicates a significantly higher rate of arrivals of new bidders in that year as
compared with year 2004. The September 11 dummy also has a significant positive effect on
the arrival of bidders and the artist decision to feature, this topic is addressed at length in
Canals and Pearcy (2005) and we would like to direct the interested reader to that paper.
There are other significant parameters in the model associated to style, medium and ground
which we do not discuss. Finally, some of the equations in the model also include controls
for the month and the day of the week when the auction ends. These and other parameters
are only included in an equation when their effect is significant.
The estimation results for the second model are presented in table 6, with those coef-
ficients significant at the usual level represented in bold. For the most part the estimated
parameters in this model accept a similar interpretation to those in the previous model.
Unfortunately, the inclusion of artists’ specific fixed effects render many of the parameters
in the previous model insignificant. The reason for this is simple, most artists specialize
on a particular style, medium or ground. Thus, the inclusion of artists specific fixed effects
absorbs most of the useful identifying variation in these variables.
C. Policy Analysis.
What is the true impact of the featured status on the selling price, after controlling
for differences between featured and non-featured items? How do sellers benefit from the
availability of the featured alternative? What is the benefit to the market intermediary?
What are the welfare benefits associated to this simple form of congestion pricing? In an
attempt to answer these questions in table 7 we present results from a policy experiment
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conducted using the estimation results from the model specification with artists’ specific
effects. This table provides information on revenues and welfare generated as a result of the
transactions observed in our data. Some of the values in this table can be computed directly
from the data while others, those in bold, are obtained by simulation of the estimated model.
The upper section of table 7 contains information under the status quo in which artists’
can choose whether to feature or not to feature their artwork. This information includes eBay
revenues, sellers’ revenues, net of posting fees paid to eBay, and buyers’ surplus computed by
simulation as the difference between the price paid and the value of the item for the winner of
the auction, under the assumption that the winner of the auction is the buyer with the highest
valuation. Fees to eBay consist of three components, insertion fees, which are computed
based on the minimum acceptable bid, final value fees which represent a percentage of the
final selling price, and listing upgrade fees which include the fees associated with featuring
the painting. The largest fee by far is usually the $19.99 “Featured Plus!” fee. Thus, it is not
surprising that the average fee paid to eBay for a featured item, $28.21, is about ten times
the average fee paid for a non-featured item. In fact, although featured items represent only
11% of our sample they also represent approximately 60% of the revenues collected by eBay
from the transactions taking place in our data. Featured items also provide close to 50%
of all artists’ revenues, and close to 50% of the buyers’ surplus, according to the models’
predictions.
Thus, given the significance of the feature choice as a source of revenue for eBay, and
for artists, as well as a source of welfare for buyers, it is interesting to ask what would be
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the effect of disposing of this alternative. Clearly, our model can simulate this scenario only
under some additional assumptions. In particular, the main assumption imposed in our
simulations is that if the feature choice did not exist buyers would have posted exactly the
same items on eBay and that buyers would have continued to behave in the way predicted
by the model for non-featured auctions. Of course, this assumption is incorrect. One can
consider reasonable scenarios in which some artists would end up posting more items while
others would end up posting less, and buyers would choose to buy more or less on eBay.
Finally, it is unlikely that eBay would maintain the same fee structure if the feature option
was not available. However, we view this exercise as a tool for understanding the importance
of the “Featured Plus!” option in this market.
The lower section of table 7 provides results from this simulation exercise. Simulations
are conducted based on 100 draws from the estimated asymptotic distribution of the model
parameters. For each one of these draws and for each observation in the sample we generate
100 realizations of the potential outcome resulting from posting an item with the charac-
teristics of the corresponding data point, and consider the average outcome. Focusing our
attention on those items that are featured in the status quo, the model predicts that average
fees paid to eBay would be reduced substantially from $28.21 to $6.35. Average revenues for
sellers would also decrease substantially from $166 to $119, and average Buyer surplus will
be reduced from $208 to $170. These effects are due to a decrease in the number of potential
buyers in these auctions. Overall, the dollar value of revenues and consumer surplus would be
$139291 instead of the original value of $192118 from the sale of the same items as featured
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under the status quo. This scenario represent a reduction of $52827, or 27%, of the value
generated by featured items, or 14% of the overall value generated in this market. Finally,
observe that even in a market without the feature choice, objects from the “Featured Plus!”
subsample command a much higher price and have a much higher probability of being sold
that other objects in our sample. This is clear evidence of selection of the best artist and
the best artwork in the “Featured Plus!” category. Thus, this seems to indicate that the
“Featured Plus!” option acts as a coordination mechanism that facilitates the match of the
best artists and the best artwork with buyers looking for the best art.
5 Conclusions.
This paper investigates the effect of a specific type of congestion price policy in the market
for art by self representing artist on eBay. This type of congestion pricing policy works by
giving sellers the option to incur an extra fee at the time of posting their items for sale and in
return having these items listed first when buyers search for specific categories. The size of
the artwork seems to be an important determinant of price after controlling for artists’ fixed
effects. Also, artists’ that have been in the market for a long period of time, and that have
a large customer base, benefit from the existence of repeated buyers. Ebay allows buyers
to rate their shopping experience, this rating is used to create a reputation index and we
use this index as a measure of artists’ reputation. Interestingly, this measure of reputation
has no significant effect on the selling price. After observing that all artist have reputation
ratings above 98% we conclude that this can only mean that artists place a high value on
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their reputation and work very hard to maintain a satisfied costumer base.
In the last part of the paper we conduct simulations based on the estimated model with
artists’ fixed effects. The results indicate that the “Featured Plus!” policy has an important
positive effect on revenues for eBay and for sellers as well as an important positive effect on
buyers’ consumer surplus. Our results also suggest that the “Featured Plus!” option acts as
a coordination mechanism that facilitates the match of the best artists and the best artwork
with buyers looking for the best art. These results underscore the relevance of pricing policies
and other kinds of market mechanisms that promote the best match between buyers and
sellers.
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    Table 1: Four Stylized Examples of eBay Auctions. 
Timing Auction 1 Auction 2 Auction 3 Auction 4 
 St. Vi St. Vi St. Vi St. Vi 
1 $10 $10 $10 $10 $10 $10 $10 $100 
2 $10 $25 $10 $50 $10 $75 $75 $75 
3 $25 $50 $25 $25 $50 $50 $75* $10* 
4 $50 $75 $50 $75 $50* $25* $75* $25* 
5 $75 $100 $75 $100 $75 $100 $75* $25* 
 We denote the true valuation of the bidder as Vi and the auction price at time t as St. In all cases; bidders 
valuations are $10, $25, $50, $75 and $100. The auctions differ in the bidders’ time of arrival. The (*) indicates 
bids that will not be recorded because they are below the auction’s minimum acceptable bid at time t. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the overall sample and the selected sub-sample. 
  Overall Sample 
 Featured Not Featured 
  Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. 
Sold 0.901 0 1 0.548 0 1 
Selling Price 194.7 10.5 1299 30.94 0.01 2435 
Num. Bids 12.01 0 52 2.203 0 48 
Num. Bidders 5.203 1 17 2.354 1 13 
Square Feet 5.371 0.292 26 1.834 0.158 30 
 Auction Duration 
Days 3 5 7 10 3 5 7 10 
Frequency 4 15 118 426 265 776 6196 2397 
Percentage 0.71 2.66 20.96 75.67 2.75 8.05 64.31 24.88 
   
Number of Obs. 574 10039 
 Selected Sub-sample 
  Featured Not Featured 
  Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. 
Sold 0.875 0 1 0.559 0 1 
Selling Price 202.2 10.5 1299 47.45 0.01 595.0 
Num. Bids 12.46 0 52 2.383 0 38 
Num. Bidders 4.867 1 17 1.391 0 13 
Square Feet 5.389 0.292 26 2.009 0.158 24 
  Auction Duration 
Days 3 5 7 10 3 5 7 10 
Frequency 3 14 112 405 103 312 2591 983 
Percentage 0.56 2.62 20.97 75.84 2.58 7.82 64.95 24.64 
   
Number of Obs. 534 3989 
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  Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for featured/not featured auctions by year. 
  Year 2001 
 Featured Not Featured 
  Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. 
Sold 0.909 0 1 0.619 0 1 
Selling Price 208.7 40.08 697.62 46.03 2.23 426.02 
Num. Bids 13.05 0 52 2.71 0 38 
Num. Bidders 5.32 0 14 1.59 0 13 
Square Feet 5.057 0.29 12.00 2.05 0.01 20.25 
 Auction Duration 
Days 3 5 7 10 3 5 7 10 
Frequency 0 0 6 16 33 85 1581 531 
Percentage 0 0 27.27 72.73 1l48 3.81 70.90 23.81 
Number of Obs. 22 2230 
 Measures of Artists’ Reputation 
 Mean Std. Min. Max. 
Number of Unique Buyers ( in 100’s) 1.08 1.01 0.03 5.25 
% of Positive Feedback from Buyers 99.84 0.44 98.05 100.00 
   
 Year 2004 
  Featured Not Featured 
  Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. 
Sold 0.873 0 1 0.484 0 1 
Selling Price 222.84 21.1 1441.41 49.77 3.00 595.5 
Num. Bids 12.44 0 49 1.959 0 29 
Num. Bidders 4.847 0 17 1.14 0 10 
Square Feet 5.404 0.444 24.00 1.950 0.021 24.00 
  Auction Duration 
Days 3 5 7 10 3 5 7 10 
Frequency 3 14 106 389 70 227 1010 452 
Percentage 0.59 2.73 20.7 75.98 3.98 12.91 57.42 25.70 
Number of Obs. 512 1759 
 Measures of Artists’ Reputation 
 Mean Std. Min. Max. 
Number of Unique Buyers ( in 100’s) 3.91 3.10 0.39 15.73 
% of Positive Feedback from Buyers 99.80 0.44 97.65 100.00 
      
Selling price is in real dollars, 2004, and includes shipping and handling fees. 
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    Table 4: Frequency distributions and average selling price by Style, Medium and Ground. 
 FEATURED NON FEATURED 
 Av. Price Frequency % Frequency Av. Price Frequency % Frequency STYLE        
Abstract  247.38 343 64.23 54.31 1475 36.98 
Contemporary  187.38 85 15.92 38.22 1234 30.94 
Cubist  211.46 74 13.86 78.99 390 9.78 
Folk  101.01 45 8.43 38.94 797 19.98 
Modern  253.54 326 61.05 77.22 260 6.52 
Urban  110.24 7 1.31 34.06 1034 25.92 
Pop  175.96 162 30.34 39.53 1466 36.75 
Other  171.48 119 22.28 47.49 949 23.79 
Null  201.76 27 5.06 42.50 2211 55.43 
       MEDIUM        
Acrylic  230.04 305 57.12 49.02 2238 56.10 
Pen and Ink  0.00 0 0 33.21 109 2.73 
Colored Pencil  0.00 0 0 17.85 17 0.43 
Collage  236.90 66 12.36 31.44 668 16.75 
Oil  207.40 158 29.59 87.01 573 14.36 
Watercolor  36.90 4 0.75 32.01 195 4.89 
Other  49.89 1 0.19 35.97 189 4.74 
       GROUND        
Stretch Canvas  228.79 505 94.57 79.18 1164 29.18 
Canvas Panel  97.24 5 0.94 37.15 1300 32.59 
Cardboard  142.84 3 0.56 23.56 198 4.96 
Paper  65.84 8 1.50 27.48 1007 25.24 
Other  128.06 13 2.43 54.86 320 8.02 
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Figure 1: Average Artist-Specific Probability 
of Sucessful Auction
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Table 5.- Estimation results for the model without artists’ specific fixed effects. 
 Featured Choice Bid Arrival Item Valuation 
 2001 2004 Featured N-Featured Featured N-Featured
Intercept -3.820 -4.369 -13.01 -13.90 3.757 2.651
Baseline1  -1.535 -0.892  
Baseline2  -0.492 0.136  
Baseline3  1.298 1.740  
Baseline4  3.956 4.267  
FEEDBACK   
eBay Feedback   
# feedbacks -1.719 -0.047 0.488 0.142 0.070 -0.008
# feedbacks2 0.125 -0.006 -0.034 -0.005 -0.003 0.003
DIMENSION   
Square-Feet 1.071 0.799 0.038 0.072 0.118 0.243
Square-Feet2 -0.041 -0.035 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.008
STYLE   
Abstract  0.129 0.237 -0.199 -0.211 -0.218
Contemporary  0.422 -0.016 -0.163 0.064 -0.243
Cubist  0.953 -0.224 0.707 -0.174 -0.047
Folk  -0.560 0.278 0.396 -0.468 -0.113
Modern  1.656 0.158 0.298 0.159 0.232
Urban  -1.376 -0.021 -0.183 -0.107
Pop  0.871 -0.056 -0.125 -0.033 -0.065
Other  0.280 0.084 0.096 0.063 -0.148
Null  -2.485 0.268 0.163 -0.211 -0.284
MEDIUM   
Acrylic  -0.233 0.099 -0.013 0.049
Pen and Ink  0.077  0.342
Colored Pencil  -1.139  -0.585
Collage  -0.296 -0.006 0.055 0.021
Oil  control -0.393 control 0.002
GROUND   
Stretch Canvas  0.094 0.420 0.347 0.632
Canvas Panel  0.353  0.263
Cardboard  0.394  0.022
Paper  0.345  -0.003
OTHER   
Year 2001  0.840 0.513  0.224
Sept. 11 2.002  0.269 -0.172 0.077
       
Month Dummy No No No Yes No Yes
Day Dummy No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
       
 N. Obs. 4523  LLF -117405.80  
       
Parameters significant at the usual 0.95 level are in bold. 
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Table 6.- Estimation results for the model with artists’ specific fixed effects. 
 Featured Choice Bid Arrival Item Valuation 
 2001 2004 Featured N-Featured Featured N-Featured
Intercept -4.851 -4.021 -12.245 -12.269 3.450 2.303
Baseline1  -1.539 -0.917  
Baseline2  -0.492 0.136  
Baseline3  1.298 1.740  
Baseline4  3.956 4.267  
FEEDBACK   
eBay Feedback   
# feedbacks  0.210 -0.088 0.187 0.050
# feedbacks2  -0.015 0.001 -0.012 -0.002
DIMENSION   
Square-Feet 1.453 1.339 0.011 0.066 0.098 0.273
Square-Feet2 -0.066 -0.047 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.009
STYLE   
Abstract  0.348 -0.184  -0.175
Contemporary  0.176 0.233  -0.090
Cubist  -0.173 0.355  -0.011
Folk  0.375 0.187  -0.152
Modern  0.169 0.293  0.101
Urban  0.350 0.343  -0.064
Pop  0.042 -0.090  -0.059
Other  0.170 0.202  -0.099
Null  0.348 0.121  -0.268
MEDIUM   
Acrylic   0.172
Pen and Ink   0.131
Colored Pencil   -0.056
Collage   0.156
Oil   -0.006
GROUND   
Stretch Canvas  0.062 0.158 0.342 0.475
Canvas Panel  0.371  0.382
Cardboard  0.155  -0.025
Paper  0.047  0.010
OTHER   
Year 2001  0.759  0.214
Sept. 11 1.917 0.112 0.476 0.090
       
Month Dummy No No No No No No
Day Dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes
       
 N. Obs. 4523  LLF -116176.76  
       
Parameters significant at the usual level are in bold.
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Table7: Simulation of eBay Revenues, Artists’ Revenues and Consumer Surplus based on the model of Table 6. 
  
  AVERAGE TOTAL 
  Featured N-Featured Overall Featured N-Featured Overall
  Status Quo 
        
EBay Revenues 28.21 2.56 5.59 15063.78 10219.11 25282.89
Seller Revenues 166.14 23.98 40.77 88720.83 95661.24 184382.10
Buyer Surplus 208.03 (71.43) 53.05 (6.06)  88333.93 90743.93 179077.90
    TOTAL 192118.50 196624.30 388742.80
  Not “Featured Option” Allowed 
       
EBay Revenues 6.35 (0.88)  3390.72   
Seller Revenues 119.20 (30.50)  63651.61   
Buyer Surplus 170.15 (27.61)  72248.82   
% Sales 0.80  (0.15) TOTAL 139291.20   
     
Simulated values, in bold, are generated using parametric bootstrap based on 100 draws from the estimated asymptotic distribution of 
parameters. Standard errors in parenthesis are only provided for simulated values, not-simulated values represent exact amounts 
computed from the current data. Sellers’ revenues are net of fees paid to eBay.  
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1 Appendix 1:
PART ONE: Next we show how to define an explicit recursive method for computing
analytically the following integral
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We consider now the analytic solution of I
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]
:
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A.- We begin with an illustrative example (K − 1 = 5,N − 2 = 6, N −K + 1 = 3):
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B.- In general,
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can be computed analytically as a polynomial function of
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PART TWO: Next we show how to compute P (v¯
N−1
≤ b
0
+∆, b
0
≤ v¯
N
|N) . We could do
that by following the same approach as in part one of this appendix. A more direct approach
makes use of the expression of the joint distribution of any two order statistics (Hogg and
Craig, 1978, page 160), in particular for (N,N − 1):
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